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On the morning of March 31, 1966, David O'Brien and three
companions burned their draft cards' on the steps of the South
Boston Courthouse in protest against the Selective Service System
and the war in Viet Nam.' The District Court of Massachusetts
rejected O'Brien's claim that his act was protected "symbolic
speech" and convicted him of wilfully and knowingly mutilating
and destroying by burning his Registration Certificate in violation
of section 12(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b), as amended, 79 Stat. 586.1
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district
court's free speech holding, 4 reasoning that since the conduct
proscribed under the 1965 Amendment was already punishable
under the possession regulation5 the amendment must have been
directed at public destruction and hence violated the first
amendment by singling out for special treatment persons engaged
1. The term "draft card" refers to either the registration certificate or the classification
certificate. Registrants with the Selective Service System are required to keep both
certificates in their personal possession at all times. 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962) (Registration
Certificates); 32 C.F.R. § 1623.5 (1962) (Classification Certificates).
2. O'Brien, who represented himself at trial, argued to the jury as follows:
I am a pacifist and as such I cannot kill, and I would not cooperate.
It is something that I felt I had to do, because I think we are basically living in a
culture to-day, a society that is basically violent, it is basically a plagued society,
plagued not only by wars, but by the basic inability on the part of people to look
at other people as human beings, the inability to feel that we can live and'love
one another, and I think we can. [Record at 29].
3. With the words "knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates" added by the 1965
Amendment, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b) presently provides:
Any person . . . (3) who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly
mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate or any notation duly
and validly inscribed thereon . . . (6). . . shall upon conviction be fined not to
exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
4. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), (The Circuit Court affirmed
O'Brien's conviction, however, on the grounds that the violation of the possession regulation,
32 C.F.R. § 1617.1, was a lesser included offense of the crime defined by the 1965
Amendment.)
5. 32C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962).
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in protest. Both the Government's and O'Brien's petitions for
certiorari were granted.6
The Supreme Court held, reversed: Because the Government
has a sufficient interest in assuring the continuing availability of
Selective Service certificates, because the 1965 Amendment is an
appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest, and because
the noncommunicative impact of defendant's conduct frustrates the
Government's interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been
shown to justify O'Brien's conviction. United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
The subjective intent of the person engaged in conduct is not
determinative as to whether that conduct will be classified as
"speech."
[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedom is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest."
6. The Government's petition claimed error in the Circuit Court's holding that the
statute was unconstitutional and that the decision conflicted with the decisions in Unitcd
States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967), and Smith
v. United States, 386 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966), upholding the 1965 Amendment against
identical "symbolic speech" challenges. O'Brien's cross petition urged error by the Circuit
Court in sustaining his conviction, contending that it was a crime of which he was neither
charged nor tried. 391 U.S. at 372.
7. 391 U.S. at 376-77. The other issue dealt with by the Court was O'Brien's reliance
upon comments by Senator Thurmond, II CONG. REC. 19746, 20433 (1965), and by
Congressmen Rivers and Bray, II CONG. REC. 19871-72 (1965), to support his claim that
the 1965 Amendment was unconstitutional as enacted because its "purpose" was to suppress
'freedom of speech. The Courtdistinguished Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), to reject this argument by saying:
"It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." 391 U.S.
at 383. Since draft card burning was regarded as conduct and not expression, the 1965
Amendment did not have the "inevitable effect" of abridging personal liberties, as was the
case in Gorillion where the legislative purpose was deemed irrelevant because the effect of
redrawing municipal boundaries would deprive Negroes of their right to vote. Id. at 385.
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The recognition that -non-verbal expression was includable
under the first amendment's guarantee also brought with it the
emphatic rejection "of the notion .. .that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those
who would communicate ideas by conduct . . . as these
amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech." s However, "[t]he range of symbolic conduct intended to
express disapproval is broad; it can extend from a thumbs-down
gesture to political assassination." 9 When conduct falls within this
broad spectrum, the problem becomes the extent to which
protection will be afforded the expressive element.
Recent cases have applied a balancing process in resolving
conflicts between personal liberties and governmental in-
terests.'0 Though not new," this process is best articulated in
American Communications Ass'n v. Doubs, a case involving the
validity of the *non-Communist affidavit provision of the Taft
Hartley Act.
When particular conduct is regulated . . . and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment
of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of these
two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under
the particular circumstances presented.3
That the balancing test is only implicitly'4 found in O'Brien
evidences the flexibility of any general test and the inconsistencies
8. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
9. United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 79 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911
(1967).
10. Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.
1966); United States v. Cooper, 279 F. Supp. 253 (D.C.D. Colo. 1968).
11. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); United Publi6 Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
12. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
13. Id. at 399 (emphasis added). For opinions critical of the balancing test see
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245; Cahn, Mr.
Justice Black and First Amendment "'Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
549 (1962); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962);
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-14
(1963). Comments supporting the test include: Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 75; Kauper, Book Review, 58 MICH. L. REv. 619 (1960);
Krislov, Mr. Justice Black Reopens the Free Speech Debate, II U.C.L.A.L. REV.
189 (1964).
14. 29 U. PIr. L. REV. 167 (1967). The author concludes that the balancing test is
expressly or impliedly used in all free expression cases, with the other .tests being
supplementary factors to be considered.
1969]
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forecast by the words "under the particular circumstances
presented." The most potent of all authority-the war clause-was
relied on as the source of the government's power to regulate issued
Selective Service certificates. From this premise a "substantial
governmental interest" in the non-destruction of draft cards was
easily found."
We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital interest in
having a system for raising armies that functions with
maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly
responding .to continually changing circumstances. For these
reasons, the Government has a substantial interest in assuring
the continuing availability of issued Selective Service
certificates . 6
The mere "assumption" that O'Brien's conduct brought the first
amendment into play, contrasted with the Court's extensive
analysis of the administrative functions performed by Selective
Service certificates," indicates a preliminary balancing in favor of
the government. The Court's adherence to these functions as
essential to conscriptive procedure seems as "unrealistic" as was
O'Brien's "unrealistic characterization of Selective Service
certificates."'" Draft procedures in effect prior to the 1965
15. See Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1961), for criticism of the balancing concept when the government asserts
its right to self-preservation.
16. 391 U.S. at 381.
17. Id. at 378-80. Four purposes that would be defeated by the destruction of Selective
Service certificates are suggested:
(1) Certificates supply proof of registration and help relieve the burden
which the System would otherwise have in verifying the registration and classi-
fication of all suspected delinquents;
(2) The information contained on the certificates facilitates communica-
tion between registrants and their local boards;
(3) Certificates continually remind registrants to notify their local boards
of any changes in address or status;
(4) The regulatory scheme helps detect alteration, forgery or similar
misuse of certificates.
18. 391 U.S. 367, 378. The popular point of view is that Selective Service certificates
provide information for the individual registrant and that they serve as an easy means of
proof of identity and age. The purposes listed supra note 17, appear to be of superficial value,
especially when it is considered that:
(1) Local draft boards have easy access to their own records when
verifying the registration and classification of suspected delinquents;
(2) Addresses of local boards are as far away as the nearest phone;
(3) It is not a certificate tucked away in a wallet, but "a reality of life"
that reminds the registrant of his obligations to his draft board;
(4) Records on file with draft boards are the proper regulatory scheme in
detecting forgery or alteration.
[Vol. 6
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Amendment had, after all, been thought adequate in assuring
effective conscription procedures 1 9 Although it could be said that
the ned for a non-mutilation statute did not arise until recently, it
is probable that the pre-1965 regulations would have been sufficient
to meet the challenge. 0 Under this view the non-mutilation
amendment is deemed supplementary only and therefore
insufficient to justify encroachments upon personal liberties.2 ' ,
The Court's statement that "both the governmental interest
and the 1965 Amendment are limited to the noncommunicative
aspect of O'Brien's conduct"22 gives rise to a dual misconception:
First, that after the widespread publicity accorded similar
incidents, the burning of one's draft card does not symbolize
protest of the draft (and probably also of the war in Viet Nam); 23
and, secondly, that the restriction upon the right of free expression
is merely "incidental" and "no greater than essential." The latter
results from the Court's failure to determine whether the activity is
essentially "conduct" or "expression. 12 4 This, in turn, may be
shown by the Court's attempted analogy between laws prohibiting
destruction of Selective Service certificates and laws prohibiting the
destruction of drivers' licenses or tax records. 5
Other prevalent registration statutes include those governing the registration of aliens
within the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1302. Wilful failure of an alien to register results in
the rather mild penalty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $1000 and/or
imprisonment not more than six months, 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), whereas counterfeiting is
punishable by a fine not to exceed $5000 and/or imprisonment not more than five years. 8
U.S.C. § 1306(d).
19. See Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1102 (1968).
20. Under the broad wording of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(3) prior to 1965, it would
already have been an offense "to forge, alter, or in any manner change a certificate or any
notation validly inscribed thereon"; (emphasis added). Selective Service regulations had
made non-possession of one's draft card a criminal offense. 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962); 32
C.F.R. § 1623.5 (1962).
21. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 449,
464 (1958).
22. 391 U.S. at 381-82.
23. Mr. Justice Jackson recognized the ability of communication by the use of symbols
when he said, "[slymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas." West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
However, a non-verbal act, initially without a fixed meaning in the public mind, must
acquire such a meaning before it will qualify as a symbol. "[A] symbol must symbolize a
specific idea or viewpoint. A symbol is merely a vehicle by which a concept is transmitted
from one person to another; unless it represents a particular idea, a 'symbol' becomes
meaningless. It is, in effect, not really a symbol at all." Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524,
527 (D.C. La. 1967).
24. Emerson, Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 996-1003
(1968); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
931-35 (1963).
25. 391 U.S. at 375.
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Wherever free speech claims have been raised, they have
generally merited some consideration. However, it seems that in
O'Brien the outcome appeared so self-evident to the Court that it
felt little necessity to articulate first amendment arguments. Add
this failure to the Court's view that "when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms," 26 and the result becomes overly broad
against a cherished background of the right to free expression.
That symbolic conduct was entitled to first amendment
protection was first recognized in Stromberg v. California" and
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette.28 In Stromberg, a Califor-
nia statute prohibiting the display of a red flag as a symbol of op-
position to organized government was held unconstitutional be-
cause of overbreadth and as an infringement on defendant's free-
dom of expression. Twelve years later in Barnette a state statute
requiring all public school children to salute the flag and pledge
allegiance was held unconstitutional as an abridgment of freedom
of speech and religion. Significant in Stromberg and Barnette was
the fact that both involved conduct universally symbolizing allegi-
ance to a nation and its ideology; and* also that no significant state
interest in regulating the conduct existed.
In People v. Street," defendant, a World War II veteran,
publicly burned an American flag to express his indignation and
outrage at the sniper shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith.
His conviction for violation of a state statute making it a
misdemeanor to "publicly burn" a United States flag was upheld,
since his conduct was an "act of incitement, literally and
figuratively 'incendiary.' "30 Although witnesses attacked O'Brien
after the burning incident, the Court did not rely on the Street
rationale for restricting expressive conduct.3
26. Id. at 376.
27. 283 U.S. 359 (193 1).
28. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
29. 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967), appeal docketed,
No. 688, U.S. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 1967.
30. Id. at 237, 229 N.E.2d at 191, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
31. In Milk Wagon Driver v. Meadomoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), the
Supreme Court distinguished Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and Carlson v.
California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940), in sustaining an injunction against the union's claim of
[Vol. 6
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In People v. Stover, 2 defendants hung rags, tattered clothing,
underwear, old uniforms and scarecrows from clotheslines in the
front yard of their home in a pleasant residential district as
"peaceful protest" against high city taxes. After six years of this
protest an ordinance was enacted prohibiting the erection and
maintenance of clotheslines in front and side yards. The court held
that aesthetic zoning was a reasonable exercise of the police power
and a permissible infringement of free expression.
The concept of "substantial governmental interest" has also
been accorded significant recognition when challenged by free
expression contentions in cases involving: maintenance of public
order;33 regulations of commercial activity;34 regulations of time,
place," purpose,36 and manner3" of speaking; violations of court
orders;38 and school regulations. 39 However, it has been held that
infringement of free speech and held that there was no free speech protection for an
"utterence in a context of violence."
It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon
rational modes of communication that the guarantee of free speech was given a
generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as
an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance
was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution.
312 U.S. at 293.
32. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963) app. dismissedfor lack
of fed. question, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). See Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First
Amendment. 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1964).
33. In Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Wis. 1967), persons accused of violat-
ing the Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute were denied injunctive relief, the court holding
that the statute did not clearly deny their right to peacefully express unpopular ideas. "The
power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect
the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted." Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
34. In Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Supreme Court held that a city
could validly prohibit distribution of circulars containing both commercial advertisement
and protest, finding that the protest was a mere sham to avoid the ordinance.
35. Coxv. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
36. "[P]icketing is not beyond the control of a State if the. . . purpose which it seeks
to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance." Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460,
465-66 (1950); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
37. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
38. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
39. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa
1966), a school regulation forbidding the wearing of black arm bands was upheld against
defendants' claim that the arm bands were symbolic protest against the war in Viet Nam.
Important factors to the court were that circumstances justified the fear that continued
wearing of arm bands "would be likely to disturb the disciplined atmosphere required for any
classroom" and, secondly, that freedom of speech was infringed upon only slightly since the
students were free to wear arm bands off school premises.
Cases involving the wearing of freedom buttons by students have had varying results.
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"particular considerations surrounding a specific act justify
clothing it in the concept of speech."4 This has been the case only
where the activity is a natural extension of the verbal expression,4
where the verbalization would lose meaning,42 where the acts are the
traditionally recognized equivalent of verbal statements, 43 or where
no reasonably alternative methods of communication are
available.44 Thus, the peaceful display of banners or pamphlets in
opposition to management, 45 "protest by silent and reproachful
presence ' 46 and "[d]oor to door distribution of circulars ' ' 47 have
been held protected exercises of free expression. The communicative
In Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), the court held that a regulation banning
the wearing of freedom buttons unconstitutionally infringed upon the students' right of free
expression since there was no showing that these buttons tended to distract the minds of the
students from their teachers. Similar facts resulted in a contrary holding in Blackwell v.
Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), where it was found that the
wearing of buttons caused student disorder and disrupted classroom procedure.
In Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 324 (D.C. La. 1967), the suspension of a student
because he didn't comply with regulations governing haircuts was upheld over his plea that
choice of hair style constituted symbolic expression. See also Leonard v. School Committee
of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
40. United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 79 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 911 (1967).
41. There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is
a form of utterance . . . Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as
religious symbols come to convey theological ones. Associated with many of
these symbols are appropriate gestures of acceptance or respect: a salute, a
bowed or bared head, a bended knee.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). cf. Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
42. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Such a demonstration, in the circumstances of these two cases, is as much a part
of the 'free trade in ideas', Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(Holmes, J., dissenting), as is verbal expression more commonly thought of as
'speech'. It, like speech, appeals to good sense and to 'the power of reason as
applied through public discussion', . . . just as much as, if not more than, a
public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner.
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961)(concurring opinion); See N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
43. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Martin v. Strutners, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938
(N.D. Ill. 1968).
44. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, upheld
a city ordinance forbidding use of public streets by sound trucks or other vehicles which
emitted "loud and raucous" noises. The manner of conducting expression was said to
be subject to reasonable limitation when other "easy means ofpublicity are open" (emphasis
added).
45. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106
(1940).
4b. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
47. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
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element in these cases was judged to be paramount. Noticeably
absent were those types of action having a destructive nature;
rather, the conduct constituted interference at most. Further, since
there were no reasonably alternative methods of conveying the
ideas, regulation of conduct meant destruction of the right to free
expression. Professor Thomas Emerson has suggested that, in
determining whether regulations are actually aimed at the
expressive element, consideration be given to forms of action
traditionally subject to regulation and to the types of sanctions
imposed.48 Ultimately, however, whether an activity constitutes
conduct or expression is dependent upon an inherently subjective
analysis.
Meaningful, therefore, in the above instances are the purposes
to which the protests were directed. Dissent against social and
economic inequalities has been granted a more enviable position
than dissent against established mores.49 It is submitted that, absent
the war-time environment surrounding O'Brien, the Court would
have been faced with a more perplexing problem.
Assuming the existence of a legitimate and substantial
governmental interest in the maintenance of issued Selective Service
certificates, it remains to be considered whether, in light of the
"speculative nature" of the possibility of damage to draft
procedures, 0 the imposition of severe punishment upon those who
burn draft cards as symbolic speech is violative of the eighth
amendment. In prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, the
eighth amendment has left to the Supreme Court the task of
articulating appropriate standards. In Trop v. Dulles, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren said that "[this] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. 52 As an aid in determining these
48. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, supra note 24 at 997.
49. Mr. Justice Jackson has warned that:
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes
more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. . . .Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only unariimity of the graveyard.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
50. Note, Symbolic Conduct, supra note 19.
51. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
52. Id. at 101. The Trop court went on to hold that denationalization as punishment
for a military deserter in time of war was cruel and unusual punishment barred by the eighth
amendment. Denationalization would have subjected defendant to a "fate of ever-increasing
fear and distress." Id. at 102.
1969]
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contemporary "standards of decency," O'Brien's counsel suggested
a comparison with the statutes governing alien registration
certificates.
Had respondent been convicted of destroying an alien
registration certificate, rather than a Selective Service System
certificate, he would have been subject to disproportionately
different punishment. Conviction of failure to possess an alien
registration certificate is a misdemeanor carrying a maximum
sentence of thirty days imprisonment and/or $100 fine.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 264(c); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1304[e]. An alien who wilfully fails to register, still a
misdemeanor, is subject to a maximum sentence of six months
imprisonment and/or $1,000 fine. Ibid., § 266(a); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1306(a). Only if the defendant has been found guilty of
counterfeiting alien registration certificates, can he receive the
felony punishment of up to five years imprisonment and/or
$5,000 fine. Ibid., § 266(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1306(d)."
The argument concludes that the punishment meted out to O'Brien
"does not meet these standards because it is 'so disproportionate to
the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the
community***.' "I' Although authorized by statute, a sentence that
is clearly disproportionate to the offense may be barred by the
eighth amendment. 5
This argument, however, was not discussed in the O'Brien
opinion." Regardless of its validity, the contempt for draft
protesters is evident. The supporting comments by Representative
Rivers exemplify the atmosphere in which the amendment was
passed:
The purpose of the bill is clear. It merely amends the draft
law by adding the words 'knowingly destroys and knowingly
mutilates' draft cards. A person who is convicted would be
subject to a fine up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to 5 years
[or both]. It is a straight forward clear answer to those who
would make a mockery of our efforts in South Vietnam by
engaging in the mass destruction of draft cards.
53. Brief for Respondent at 73-74.
54. Id. at 75.
55. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). Generally, however, opinions in
regard to the severity of punishment are questions of legislative policy, not subject to judicial
review. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
56. See material cited note 7 supra, for a discussion of the Court's rationale for not
examining the legislative history of the 1965 Amendment.
[Vol. 6
COMMENTS
. . . This is the least we can do for our men in South
Vietnam fighting to preserve freedom, while a vocal minority in
this country thumb their noses at their own Government.5 7
An act of recognized expressive significance was thus, by its
inclusion in a section chiefly concerned with the knowing issuance,
transfer or possession of forged Selective Service certificates, made
comparably severe and comparably punishable.
The result in O'Brien appears to be an unequivocal answer to
those who would engage in similar acts of civil disobedience
claiming "symbolic speech" protection. However, in view of the
recognition that modern first amendment guarantees protect the
communication of ideas of public interest, the Court's hasty
dismissal of defendant's symbolic speech claim is not justified. The
finding of a significant governmental interest is by itself insufficient
to preclude examination of good faith free speech issues." The
balancing test will be validly applied to "symbolic speech"
situations only when the Court proceeds to thoroughly examine the
substantiality of the alleged expressive element.
JAMES R. GOODWIN
57. 111 CONG. REC. 19871 (1965) (emphasis added).
58. For the view that the clear and present danger test is applicable to draft card
burning cases see Emerson, supra note 24, at 998.
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